Govern(ed) “Legally” Defined

The following definitions for “govern” and “governed” are taken from Ballantine’s Law Dictionary (3rd edition) and Webster’s Dictionary (1828):




To direct and control;  to regulate;  to influence;  to restrain;  to manage [State v Ream, 16 Neb 681, 683].




Directed;  regulated by authority;  controlled;  managed;  influenced;  restrained.

Freedom is More Than Just a 7-Letter Word

People who are desperate for freedom in their lives are susceptible to any explanation that seems half-way plausible. Con artists take advantage of these people by manipulating them into thinking that the rules of the game are as they described them, lacking any kind of source citations proving the accuracy of their claims. Memes can be used to plant the seed of an accurate idea, but on the other hand, bullshit can travel just as easily.



Some political dissidents who assert that they understand what the law says strongly remind me of misguided children who think they know everything. Statements like, “All Law is Commerce; All Commerce is Contract; No Contract – No Case” smacks of when one of my nephews used to say, “All the toys in the box are mine,” and “Mommy is not the boss of me.” Just because someone said so does not therefore mean there is any sort of lawful authority or valid truth behind their claims at all; unfortunately, too many naïve libertarians swallow these fairy tales all too easily.

The author makes several questionable assertions right out of the gate. First, she says that “we” may not take more than “our fare share” (whatever that is supposed to mean is anyone’s guess). Second, she claims money is an illusion because the fiat currency is brought into circulation within the money supply by way of fractional reserve lending (obviously, she fails to distinguish between government fiat currency and free-market money). Third, she seems to have a major problem with law dictionaries changing the meaning of the words (I thought vernacular dictionaries did the same thing, don’t they?). Fourth, she then claims that religion is an illusion, but subsequently refused to explain why that is the case other than a brief reference to Zecharia Sitchin and his translation of some ancient Sumerian tablets (at least Peter Joseph tried to argue the case by describing the Bible as an “astrotheological literary hybrid”).

Somewhat similar to Mary Elizabeth: Croft, “Veronica: of the Chapman family” spells out her name thusly because, like Croft, she too is making a grammatical distinction between her natural person and what is claimed to be an artificial person bearing her name, as demonstrated whenever her name is completely capitalized (such as VERONICA CHAPMAN). Neither of these women have proven that their names, when completely capitalized, is evidence of an artificial person (what Chapman calls a “strawman”); she has also not proven that such an artificial person is evidence of her suffering from capitis dimunitio; and third, neither of them explain how it could be possible, according to the Federal Style Manual (16.1), than an attempt at “good appearance” would constitute a loss of liberty. Also, nearly everything else Chapman mentions is predicated upon her being completely accurate on her interpretation about the relationship a natural person allegedly has with an artificial person bearing the same name. Again, I don’t think she either has adequately demonstrated such to be the case, especially seeing how the government has consistently rejected similar arguments (such as in United States v. Frech, United States v. Washington, and United States v. Ford). As if that wasn’t bad enough, Chapman also rejects the use of Mr., Mrs., Miss, and Ms., because she considers them as titles indicating the STRAWMAN itself.

There are a few words Chapman uses that don’t seem to hold water. For instance, she says that there are four criteria for a contract to be enforceable:


Full Disclosure: Which means that each Party writes down exactly what their promise comprises, and all the relevant circumstances, so as to put it into context they consider applicable. If one has any sense, any necessary ‘get outs’ should be included within the Full Disclosure.

Equal Consideration: A Contractual Consideration is an ‘item of value.’ It may be money, or it may be an item. Both Parties must consider the exchange to be equal in value.

Lawful Terms and Conditions: Which, fundamentally, means that there should be no mischief in the proposed agreements.

Mutual Intent: Which means ‘some manifestation that each Party intended to Contract.’ This could be hand-written signature ‘marks,’ or can be ‘conduct.’ In other words if at least one of the Parties starts to do what was promised. This is sometimes expressed as ‘performance’ – or, at least, ‘the start of performance.’”


Last time I checked, a contract is an agreement between consenting parties. Any consideration is not limited to physical items, but may also be an exchange of labor. With regards to society, I think John Locke would vehemently disagree with Chapman’s application of the term as a type of civic organization that a member can resign from without having to move to another town. Her conception of the common law having four key rules initially sounds good, but lacks evidence:


  1. Not breach the peace;
  2. Cause no-one else any harm;
  3. Cause no-one else any loss;
  4. Not use mischief in your promises and agreements.


It is not made clear whether this is found somewhere in judicial case law, or if it is only a subjective observation of the common law itself. Finally, I don’t know whether “consensus facit legem” means “Consent makes the law;” even if it does, I sincerely doubt that idea has been held as acceptable by the courts.

What is unique that Chapman brings to the table is her recommendation that your rights can be “claimed” if you file a specific public notice called A Notice of Understanding and Intent and a Claim of Right (NOUICOR). The idea here seems to be that by getting such a document notarized by a public notary, it is allegedly possible for an individual to exempt himself from having to obey legal statutes (with lawful excuse to disobey the government, as it were). Unfortunately, Chapman’s own NOUICOR located in Appendix D asserts that:


“You can make your own Law. Law that applies only to you. It is (basically) an Affidavit and an Oath combined. A Statement of Truth…as you see it. Provided it is not objected to, in the manner described in the Chapter on Noticing, then it becomes Your Truth. Even though you may be wrong. Remember: If you were wrong, then it should have received objections within the stated time period.”


As she described within the chapter in question, her NOUICOR assumes that no government agent is going to challenge her, and by not doing so, the government is acquiescing to her claims that she is exempt from statute, and so on. Interestingly enough, this “reasonable amount of time” is no longer than two weeks.

Chapter 15, entitled Fundamental Established Axioms, may or may not be true, yet, there is no source citation proving that her eighteen claimed “axioms” are objectively true, judicially speaking. Although she has a point with regards to signatures, I can’t help but think that Chapman has trouble keeping her story straight, because first she said that the contest was between Common Law and Admiralty/Maritime jurisdiction, but then she switched her tune to it being Common Law and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC); does she claim that UCC is part of Admiralty? Then there is her assertion that court orders are like restaurant orders, in that both are chargeable for a bill. On top of it all, she is an admitted conspiracist; her biggest claim is that everything is an illusion. Make of that what you will.

Veronica: of the Chapman family’s Freedom is More Than Just a 7-Letter Word feels more like an atheist version of Croft’s book. Unlike Croft, though, Chapman when on to create a PowerPoint slide entitled, The Grand Deceptions, which she uses for her lectures, like the one she gave at Truth Juice in Wales not that long ago. Other than her recommendation on filing a NOUICOR, which includes a fee schedule, I don’t really see anything else uniquely different, or more importantly, anything truly useful about Chapman’s book. Like Croft, Chapman shares the unfounded assumption that ALL CAPTIAL LETTERS written on bills and other legal documents must therefore prove that every citizen suffers from some sort of capitis dimunitio, which I consider to be a nonsequiter. Interestingly though, Chapman mentions Irene-Maus: Gravenhorst by name, although I still fear that Gravenhorst never got around to publicly admitting whether or not she defeated the government’s attempt to change the locks on her foreclosed home.

Acquiescence “Legally” Defined

The following definitions for “acquiescence” are taken from Ballantine’s Law Dictionary (3rd edition), Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (6th edition), Black’s Law Dictionary (2nd edition), and Webster’s Dictionary (1828):




A tacit approval or at least an indication of lack of disapproval. Acceptance, perhaps without approval, as acquiescence in a decision [Stockstrom v Commissioner, 88 App DC 286, 190 F2d 383, 20 ALR2d 443, disapproved on the grounds in Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 US 180, 1 L Ed 2d 746, 77 S Ct 707]. Conduct from which may be inferred assent with a consequent estoppel or quasi-estoppel [Uccello v. Gold’n Foods, 325 Mass 319, 90 NE2d 530, 16 ALR2d 459]. The position of one who knows that he is entitled to impeach a transaction or to enforce a right and who neglects to do so for such a length of time that under the circumstances of the case the other party may fairly infer that he has waived or abandoned his fight [Scott v Jackson, 89 Cal 258, 26 P 899, quoting Rapalje and Lawrence’s Law Dictionary; see also, Lux v Haggin, 69 Cal 255, 10 P 674].



  1. The consent which is implied given by one or both parties, to a proposition, a clause, a condition, a judgement, or to any act whatever.
  2. When a party is bound to elect between a paramount right and a testamentary disposition, his acquiescence in a state of things which indicates an election, when he was aware of his rights will be prima facie evidence of such election [Vide 2 Ves. Jr. 371; 12 Ves. 136 1 Ves. Jr. 335; 3 P. Wms. 315. 2 Rop. Leg. 439].
  3. The acts of acquiescence which constitute an implied election, must be decided rather by the circumstances of each case than by any general principle [1 Swanst. R. 382, note, and the numerous cases there cited].
  4. Acquiescence in the acts of an agent, or one who has assumed that character, will, be equivalent to an express authority [2 Bouv. Inst. n. 1309; Kent, Com. 478; Story on Eq. 255; 4 W. C. C. R. 559; 6 Miss. R. 193; 1 John. Cas. 110; 2 John. Cas. 424 Liv. on Ag. 45; Paley on, Ag. By Lloyd, 41 Pet. R. 69, 81, 12 John. R. 300; 3 Cowen’s R. 281; 3 Pick. R. 495, 505; 4 Mason’s R. 296]. Acquiescence differs from assent.



Acquiescence is where a person who knows that he is entitled to impeach a transaction or enforce a right neglects to do so for such a length of time that, under the circumstances of the case, the other party may fairly infer that he has waived or abandoned his right [Scott v. Jackson, 89 Cal. 258, 26 Pac. 898; Lowndes v. Wicks, 69 Conn. 15, 36 Atl. 1072; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Perdue, 40 W. Va. 442, 21 S. E. 755; Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 420].

  • Acquiescence and laches are cognate but not equivalent terms. The former is a submission to, or resting satisfied with, an existing state of things, while laches implies a neglect to do that which the party ought to do for his own benefit or protection. Hence laches may be evidence of acquiescence. Laches imports a merely passive assent, while acquiescence implies active assent [Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 678; Kenyon v. National Life Ass’n, 39 App. Div. 276, 57 N. Y. Supp. 60; Johnson-Brinkman Commission Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 126 Mo. 345, 28 S. W. 870, 26 L.R.A. 840, 47 Am. St. Rep. 675].




A quiet assent; a silent submission, or submission with apparent content; distinguished from avowed consent on the one hand, and on the other, from opposition or open discontent; as, an acquiescence in the decisions of a court, or in the allotments of providence.

How I Clobbered Every Bureaucratic Cash-Confiscatory Agency Known to Man

Political dissidents have been trying to understand what the Law is, and what it is not. Many of them attempt to interpret the jumble of legalese they read into some sort of cohesive sounding legal theory. Unfortunately, too many of them persist in their errors, even after several judges in multiple court cases have ruled those interpretations to be incorrect (at least, according to the government).



Much of this book is little more than the author demonstrating that she is a religious conspiracist. While her subjective views about the nature of humanity are entertaining, I fail to see what they have anything at all to do with either law or money. There’s also the sneaking suspicion I have that among all the pseudo-metaphysical drivel she spouts, her book appears to be a regurgitating advertisement for A Course in Miracles, which itself seems to be little more than a brainwashing propaganda tool designed to trick the reader into thinking that nothing objectively exists.

It is possible to save a lot of time and effort by merely reading the summary on one page towards the end of the book, where the author’s three main arguments are presented concisely, her first one claiming that:


“The name on any charging instrument, e.g.: traffic tickets, tax bills, statements, loans, lawsuits, debts, etc. is not your name. It is the name of the government-created corporation, cleverly disguised, in upper case letters, by the bureaucrats, to resemble your name. Do not blow off this fact. It is to deceive you into believing you are liable for its debts. You are not. Check the name on any government-issued ID you have. Your name is not on it. By the way, this applies also in reverse: What you think you ‘own,’ e.g.: your house, because you think it is in your name, is not in your name, ergo, you do not own it. The Commerce Game was set up by the Global Elite/World Bank to confiscate your funds and property in order to make economic slaves of the entire population of a New World Order under their corporate control.”


Where is the proof that this assertion is true? “Mary Elizabeth: Croft” spells out her name thusly because she seems to believe that by doing so, she is making the grammatical distinction between her natural person and a supposed artificial person that, allegedly as a corporation, is attached to herself, as demonstrated whenever her name is completely capitalized (such as MARY ELIZABETH CROFT). There are several problems with this line of reasoning. First, she has not proven that her name, when completely capitalized, is evidence of an artificial person; second, she has not proven that such an artificial person is evidence of her suffering from capitis dimunitio; third, how does she explain the fact that according the Federal Style Manual, 16.1, it clearly states:


“The general principle involved in the typography of datelines, addresses, and signatures is that they should be set to stand out clearly from the body of the letter or paper that they accompany. This is accomplished by using caps and small caps and italics, as set forth below. Other typographic details are designed to ensure uniformity and good appearance. Street addresses and ZIP Code numbers are not to be used. In certain lists that carry ZIP Code numbers, regular spacing will be used preceding the ZIP Code. Certain general instructions apply alike to datelines, addresses, and signatures.”


How does an attempt at “good appearance” constitute a loss of liberty? Everything else she mentions, particularly in this line of argumentation, is predicated upon her being completely accurate on her interpretation about the relationship a natural person allegedly has with an artificial person bearing the same name. I don’t think she has adequately demonstrated such to be the case, especially seeing how the government has consistently rejected similar arguments (such as in United States v. Frech, United States v. Washington, and United States v. Ford).

Mary Elizabeth: Croft’s next argument is where she asserts:


“The only law in existence today is Contract Law. What you think of as ‘laws’ are only statutes and do not apply to you; they apply only to corporations. If you have no contract with the entity from which you receive a charging instrument, you are not financially liable…and…you couldn’t possibly have a contract because corporations cannot lawfully contract. What you signed was a unilateral, and hence, unenforceable contract. All Law is Commerce; All Commerce is Contract; No Contract – No Case. There is not one government agency, department, or ministry in the world that can prove that you must pay what we have all been indoctrinated to believe we are ‘bound by law’ to pay. Do not fall for this incredible deception any longer. Your ticket to financial freedom is to REMEMBER WHO YOU ARE.”


If that were true, then how do you explain tort law? Whenever there is damage to person or property, and the accused is brought into court, there is no contract at play, but only whether retributive or restitutional justice will take place based upon a conviction of the defendant’s guilt. Also, where is the proof that legal statutes only apply to artificial persons? Croft contradicts herself here when she claims that corporations cannot contract, for the very simple reason that they can, because they are artificial persons, pursuant to that horrid 14th Amendment. And what does “remembering” that you are a natural person have to do with securing your liberty at all?

Croft’s final argument is that:


“The only way out of this mess is to remove ourselves from the Commerce Game – completely – so that we are no longer dependent upon banksters. Their sole agenda is to control and destroy us. The only way to win is not to play. Compensation which involves the banks is hazardous; we can create for ourselves all that is way bigger and better – love and light, peace and joy, compassion and forgiveness – that which we were meant to Be, Do, and Have. By remembering who we are we will learn to do what we love to do and serve ourselves by serving others, thereby leaving the banksters completely out of our new way of life. It is happening.”


Here, I will wholeheartedly agree with her that the power of noncompliance encompasses a valuable series of techniques; however, how do you stop using Federal Reserve Notes in your daily life? More importantly, how do you revoke your consent to be governed? Apparently, Croft has about as much interest in answering that last question as The Anti-Terrorist does, which is to say, none at all.

Mary Elizabeth: Croft’s How I Clobbered Every Bureaucratic Cash-Confiscatory Agency Known to Man: A Spiritual Economics Book on $$$ and Remembering Who You Are is a totally useless book written by one of those alleged “Freemen-on-the-Land.” I reiterate, where is the evidence proving that a citizen’s name, as printed in all capitalized letters, demonstrates that a citizen’s status suffers from capitis dimunitio? This unfounded assumption that ALL CAPITAL LETTERS on bills and other legal documents must therefore prove that every citizen suffers from some form of capitis dimunitio is literally a nonsequitur. I think everyone, including the so-called “Freemen,” would be better off double-checking their if arguments happen to include any common fallacies in their reasoning. Perhaps once the Freemen present cogently reasoning arguments, instead of fallacious ones, then maybe their claims would bear serious reexamination.

Capitis Dimunitio “Legally” Defined

The following definitions for “capitis diminutio” are taken from Ballantine’s Law Dictionary (3rd edition) and Black’s Law Dictionary (2nd edition):




Capitis diminuito maxima: a complete loss of civil status.

Capitis diminuito media: a partial loss of civil status.

Capitis diminuito minima: a slight loss of civil status.



In Roman law, a diminishing or abridgment of personality. This was a loss or curtailment of a man’s status or aggregate of legal attributes and qualifications, following upon certain changes in his civil condition. It was of three kinds, enumerated as follows:

  • Capitis diminuito maxima: the highest or most comprehensive loss of status. This occurred when a man’s condition was changed from one of freedom to one of bondage, when he became a slave. It swept away with it all rights of citizenship and all family rights.
  • Capitis diminuito media: a lesser or medium loss of status. This occurred where a man lost his rights of citizenship, but without losing his liberty. It carried away also the family rights.
  • Capitis diminuito minima: the lowest or least comprehensive degree of loss of status. This occurred where a man’s family relations alone were changed. It happened upon the arrogation of a person who had been his own master, (sui juris,) or upon the emancipation of one who had been under the patria potestas. It left the rights of liberty and citizenship unaltered [see Inst. 1, 16, pr.; 1, 2, 3; Dig. 4, 5, 11; Mackeld. Rom. Law § 144].

The Anti-Terrorist Handbook

Real and imagined conspiracies both suffer from the critical problem of not being solvable. All the undue focus on potential future calamities is inculcated by unscrupulous Internet pundits who desire to manipulate those who suffer from too much media consumption through the news cycle. Thankfully, there are conspiracists who have a much more down to Earth perspective on the nature of the situation we are all suffering under.



As a self-acknowledged conspiracist, the author confesses that he thinks there are “Powers That Be” (PTB) who are hell bent on world domination; yet, he tends to discard credence to any purported conspiracy that he can’t do anything about. Most of his book tackles such topics as the existence of secret societies, the dumbing down effect of public schools, the fraudulent debasement of the currency, the dangers of drinking fluoridated water, the pseudo-science of climate change (as an excuse to impose carbon taxes), the hypnotizing capabilities of television, the best rebuttal I’ve ever read against forced inoculations, and some philosophical thoughts about how to understand freedom. What intrigued me most about his book, and what I want to concentrate on here, is his explanation of the law itself.

The Anti-Terrorist (AT) begins discussing the law by stating:


“Unknowingly, we the people of America, Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have been cunningly coerced out of our Common Law rights and forced into ‘Admiralty.’ We were enticed to volunteer into this civil jurisdiction through the benefits offered by the Social Security contract, drivers and business licenses, marriage licenses, and other contractual obligations with the Government. It’s done with our consent. We gave up our unalienable rights under the Common Law and our constitutions for privileges under the civil law of the state.”


As far as I understand it, common law is judicial case precedent. Does AT mean that court decisions recognize our preexisting inalienable rights? Also, I’m unsure about his claim that “we” were “enticed to volunteer,” given that in some jurisdictions a newborn’s parents are coerced into registering their child with the State, yet in others they are tricked into it; this blanket assertion he makes already raises my eyebrow. He goes onto state:


“As English society developed over the years, situations arose for which the courts of Common Law couldn’t provide relief by any process; the dispute didn’t involve property – they didn’t involve any substance. The only remedy was to petition the King, who appointed his first minister to solve these problems. The minister was called a Chancellor and the relief granted was called Equity. Equity basically meant ‘what would be fair if the Common Law principle was extended and applied to the case at hand?’ As a result, England and America developed two distinct systems of law and court, each having a unique and specific relevance and jurisdiction. Equity jurisdiction is designated ‘in personum,‘ a jurisdiction in which you don’t have any rights but one to which you volunteer to be subject. In other words, we can submit to binding arbitration, but it has to be with our consent.”


If that’s true, then how does AT explain the “consensual” nature of when an individual ignores a court subpoena and then the police are sent to forcibly bring him in? He continues:


“Admiralty Maritime jurisdiction – firmly entrenched in the civil law system – is the law of the ruler, the rule of the sea, the rule of money, the law of the nobility; it deals with profits, taxes, and contracts. It’s predicated upon the Ten Planks of the Communist Manifesto, and the Ten Planks are simply a reincarnation of the ancient Babylonian mystery religions that have been around for about 5,000 years. You can call it communism, you can call it socialism, but it is the exact opposite, the diametric opposite of the Ten Commandments, 180 degrees opposite to The Bill of Rights and Constitution. You don’t have to be on a ship at sea to come under Admiralty jurisdiction. The jurisdiction can apply simply because the issue falls within the scope of maritime law, such as the use of bills, notes, checks (cheques), and credit.”


While it is true that admiralty is the law of the sea, I’m not quite understanding what that has anything to do with having a Social Security Number (SSN) or a driver’s license, unless he is implying that having things like those somehow brings a citizen to be susceptible to those statutes because of their wording, but again, that is an assumption on my part as to what I think he meant. Nevertheless, he continues:


“There are 2.5 million statutes in the West, and they’re all done by contract, specifically by adhesion contracts. An adhesion contract – that’s probably a contract you don’t know anything about and you don’t have to know anything about the terms and conditions of these contracts to be bound by them. A warranty, for instance, that’s an adhesion contract. Driver’s licenses, marriage licenses, business licenses, Social Security, the dole – they’re all adhesion contracts.”


Is he insinuating that these adhesion contracts are evidence of a citizen being subject to admiralty? Continuing on:


“If you don’t have a Social Security number, or a national insurance number, you won’t have any contact with the Inland Revenue or the IRS – unless, of course, you’re out there operating in trade, commerce, business and industry, depositing your Bank of England notes or Federal Reserve notes into a bank. But if you’re working in private business and trading your labour, which is property, for gold and silver, which is property, in a property-for-property transaction, you’re never going to hear from the IRS or the Inland Revenue. If you buy a house and pay for it in gold coin and work on that house and fix it up then sell the house for gold coin, you’ll never hear from the Government.”


Wow, that’s a pretty impressive claim, if it could be proven true and accurate. Obviously, a whole slew of problems crop up if you try to seek employment without a SSN, so unless you’re already established in your field, or already independently wealthy, I don’t see how it would be possible to make the transition, even if you had wanted to. I also loved this comment regarding firearms:


“There’s no right to have a gun in Admiralty jurisdiction, and that’s why all you guys out there in the States with licensed weapons are going to lose your weapons first because you registered them; you handed over title to the Government. The Government now owns your weapon, they have a controlling share in the contract with you and they can remove it from you anytime they like because it’s more theirs than yours. You gave up your claim to property and property rights and adopted the first plank to the Communist manifesto, the abolition of all rights to property. You got what you wanted – you asked for it – what are you complaining about? However, you guys out there who have unregistered, unlicensed weapons, you’re going to be fine as long as you don’t register them. Except, of course, then it’s just a case of the Government taking them from you using unlawful force…”


This unique argument differs from the privacy one against gun registration because AT is claiming here that registered firearms are the property of the State. Of course, the bigger implication is that anything else you register with the government also becomes their property and is thus not yours. AT then makes this statement:


“If the Government and the insurance companies can get together and compel you to buy car insurance, they can compel you to buy television sets and carpet, or anything they want, can’t they? Think about it – if the Government can compel you to buy car insurance why can’t they compel you to buy health insurance, life insurance, toothbrushes, furniture, or bowling balls? Friends, you agreed to it in advance. Remember, joining Social Security and getting a national insurance number was voluntary, what goes after that voluntary action is mandatory.”


Now this makes a whole lot of sense. Texas coerces drivers to buy auto insurance coverage. So, with the looming specter of Obamacare being forced onto the population early next year, I can’t say I’m at all surprised. What I am skeptical about here though, is AT’s claim that these adhesion contracts are proof of my consent to be governed, and thus makes me subject to all of this horrid shit, with the proviso being, if I repudiate these adhesion contracts, I would be able to legally revoke my consent to be governed:


“If you need a guardian, if you need the Government to look after you, change your nappy for you, fine, no one’s going to force you to change your lifestyle. Some people like rules and controls, it makes them feel safe. But if you’re complaining about the tyranny we’re facing at the moment, you’re complaining about the contracts that you have volunteered into, even if unknowingly so…[t]he solution to your problem is not more government, it’s less government; you need to investigate and take control of the adhesion contracts. Look into your Social Security contract, your driver’s contracts and your marriage licenses. Any contract created without full disclosure is fraud. Were you made aware you were giving up your rights when you signed these contracts?”


I guess that proviso of mine was right, wasn’t it? But so what? Even if he was absolutely correct, the key question then becomes, how do I revoke such adhesion contracts?

AT’s philosophical musings should be mentioned by me as well here. He states:


“I have been accused of advocating anarchy in the past. Well, somewhere between ‘anarchy’ and ‘police state’ there is freedom and normalcy. Anarchy is total lawlessness, which is what you’ve got over there in Baghdad, and then – here in Great Britain and the United States – we have a ‘police state.’ I’m advocating something in between.”


So, AT is using the legal definition of anarchy here. Elaborating on this, he says:


“There has been a sure and steady erosion of rights, privileges and immunities in the way we exercise our lifestyles, but the question arises, is this done because the government came in and put a gun to your head and used constraint and coercion, threat or force or violence? Or, is it the case that the government made offers to you, and you accepted those offers and you have enslaved yourself by way of your own hand or your own mouth? Has this been imposed upon you against your will and over your objection, or are you the cause of your own injury? I contend that the latter is the modality that we Brits and Americans have used to become feudal serfs. I don’t think the word slave is quite correct. Bond servitude is probably the better legal term to use. We’re not actually slaves, we’re bondservants, since bond servitude is an ancient modality that goes back to the Mosaic Law at Mount Sinai. Bonded servitude is always accomplished by the free will and consent of the bondservant.”


I agree with him that the various Internet pundit slogans such as, “We are not your slaves!,” while true, is implicitly misleading, because there are no physical chains, so bondservant would be the more accurate word to use to infer what some have referred so as “debt slavery.” AT goes on to blast the welfare State:


“The Government needs to control the people and generate revenue, so the first thing they do is they put a license out there and tell you that if you get the license there are many benefits. Of course, you want the benefits, so you get the license. There is no downside; it’s all plus, until they get everyone licensed. Once everyone is licensed, they introduce all of the taxes that go with it.”


This would seem to indicate that the idea here is to stubbornly avoid becoming licensed at all if your goal is to avoid paying taxes or being controlled:


“The police state imposed on the Chinese people by force is no different than the one we Americans and Brits have imposed upon ourselves today, except for the fact that we paid to have our rights taken in favour of contracts without benefits. The Chinese, at least, saved some money. However, we still have our rights, they’re still there to claim, and we can reject limited liability, perpetual slavery and debt whenever we want to accept responsibility for our actions and debts. The Chinese can’t.”


This is rather interesting, for AT is proposing that there is still a peaceful way out of the whole police state nonsense (at least for those in the West), but that those who aren’t in the West are automatically screwed, unless they stage a revolution. Finally, AT says that:


“There aren’t many people who want to trade their slavery and apparent safety for the conscientiousness of the life of a free man. But for those free men and women who want to be free, the choice is theirs. Every person who wants to be free can free himself or herself, but no one else can free them. The masses prefer security; social security, limited liability, and the satisfaction of having others control their lives. If you want to be truly free and claim your rights, you’re obligated to defend them – and your last breath, if necessary.”


I think this is the real challenge for libertarians and others to contemplate, but again, how do I revoke these adhesion contracts? Part of me thinks he is simply raising “awareness” of this issue, and I think it is left up to the reader to perform their due diligence and seek their answer to that key question on their own.

The Anti-Terrorist’s TheAntiTerrorist Handbook is perhaps not only the most reasonable introduction to real conspiracies, but also to the whole “Freeman-on-the-Land” zeitgeist. While I am left with more questions than answers, AT certainly does an adequate job of bringing up this entire field of study, which can then either be verified or debunked on its own merits. As a closing thought, I found this statement by AT to be particularly enlightening:


“Hopelessness, loss of meaning, and existential distress are proposed as the core features of the diagnostic category of Demoralization Syndrome. DS can be differentiated from depression and is recognizable in palliative care settings. It is associated with chronic medical illness, disability, bodily disfigurement, fear of loss of dignity, social isolation and – where there is a subjective sense of incompetence and/or powerlessness – feelings of greater dependency on others or the perception of being a burden. Because of this sense of impotence, those with the syndrome predictably progress to a desire to die or to commit suicide.”


Having recovered from DS, I can absolutely empathize with anyone else who is still in the throughs of it. Maybe once dissidents starting separating the wheat from the chaff and then burn the latter, DS will become a thing of the past.

Consent “Legally” Defined

The following definitions for “consent” are taken from Ballantine’s Law Dictionary (3rd edition), Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (6th edition), Black’s Law Dictionary (2nd edition), and Webster’s Dictionary (1828):





To agree or give assent to something proposed or requested.


Agreement; approval; acquiescence. Unity of opinion – accord of minds – to thinking alike – being of one mind. Consent involves the presence of two or more persons, for without at least two persons there cannot be a unity of opinion, or an accord of minds, or any thinking alike [Huntley v Holt, 58 Conn 445, 449]. As a defense in a prosecution for rape: – an exercise of the intelligence, based upon knowledge of the significance of the act and the question for morality involved therein, in making a choice between resistance and assent [People v Palvino, 216 App Div 319, 214 NY 577, 578].


  1. An agreement to something proposed and differs from assent [Wolff, Ins. Nat. part 1, SSSS 27-30; Pard. Dr. Com. Part 2, tit. 1, n. 1, 38 to 178]. Consent supposes:
    1. a physical power to act
    2. a moral power of acting
    3. a serious, determined, and free use of these powers [Fonb. Eq. Bl 1, c. 2, s. 1; Grot. de Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. 2, c. 11, s. 6].
  2. Consent is either express or implied. Express, when it is given viva voce, or in writing; implied, when it is manifested by signs, actions, or facts, or by inaction or silence, which raise a presumption that the we consent has been given.
  3. When a legacy is given with a condition annexed to the bequest, requiring the consent of executors to the marriage of the legatee, and under such consent being given, a mutual attachment has been suffered to grow up, it would be rather late to state terms and conditions on which a marriage between the parties should take place [2 Ves. & Beames, 234; Ambl. 264; 2 Freem. 201]; unless such consent was obtained by deceit or fraud [1 Eden, 6; 1 Phillim. 200; 12 Ves. 19].
  4. Such a condition does not apply to a second marriage [3 Bro. C. C. 145; 3 Ves. 239].
  5. If the consent has been substantially given, though not modo et forma, the legatee will be held duly entitled to the legacy [1 Sim. & Stu. 172; 1 Meriv. 187; 2 Atk. 265].
  6. When trustees under a marriage settlement are empowered to sell “with the consent of the husband and, wife,” a sale made by the trustees without the distinct consent of the wife, cannot be a due execution of their power [10 Ves. 378].
  7. Where a power of sale requires that the sale should be with the consent of certain specified individuals, the fact of such consent having been given, ought to be evinced in the manner pointed out by the creator of the power, or such power will not be considered as properly executed [10 Ves. 308. Vide, generally, 2 Supp. to Ves. jr. 161, 165, 169; Ayliffe’s Pand. 117; 1 Rob. Leg.. 345, 539].
  8. Courts of equity have established the rule, that when the true owner of property stands by, and knowingly suffers a stranger to sell the same as his own, without objection, this will be such implied consent as to render the salve valid against the true owner [Story on Ag. 91 Story on Eq. Jur. 385 to 390]. And courts of law, unless restrained by technical formalities, act upon the principles of justice; as, for example, when a man permitted, without objection, the sale of his goods under an execution against another person [6 Adolph. & El 11.469 9 Barn. & Cr. 586; 3 Barn. & Adolph. 318, note].
  9. The consent which is implied in every agreement is excluded:
    1. By error in the essentials of the contract; is, if Paul, in the city of Philadelphia, buy the horse of Peter, which is in Boston, and promise to pay one one hundred dollars for him, the horse at the time of the sale, unknown to either party, being dead. This decision is founded on the rule that he who consents through error does not consent at all; non consentiunt qui errant [Dig. 2, 1, 15; Dig. Lib. 1, tit. Ult. 1. 116, 2].
    2. Consent is excluded by duress of the party making the agreement.
    3. Consent is never given so as to bind the parties, when it is obtained by fraud.
    4. It cannot be given by a person who has no understanding, as an idiot, nor by one who, though possessed of understanding, is not in law capable of making a contract, as a feme convert.



A concurrence of wills.

Express consent is that directly given, either viva voce or in writing.

Implied consent is that manifested by signs, actions, or facts, or by inaction or silence, which raise a presumption that the consent has been given [Cowen v. Paddock, 62 Hun. 622, 17 N.Y. Supp. 388].

Consent in an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing as in a balance the good or evil on each side [1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 222; Plummer v. Com., 1 Bush (Ky.) 76; Dicken v. Johnson, 7 Ga. 492; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 114, 21 Am. Dec. 262; People v. Studwell, 91 App. Div. 469, 86 N. Y. Supp. 967].

  • There is a difference between consenting and submitting. Every consent involves a submission; but the mere submission does not necessarily involve consent [9 Car. & P. 722].

  • Consent decree: see DECREE

  • Consent judgment: see JUDGMENT



CONSENT, n. [L., to be of one mind, to agree; to think, feel or perceive. See Sense and Assent.]

1. Agreement of the mind to what is proposed or state by another; accord; hence, a yielding of the mind or will to that which is proposed; as, a parent gives his consent to the marriage of his daughter. We generally use this word in cases where power, rights, and claims are concerned. We give consent, when we yield that which we have a right to withhold; but we do not give consent to a mere opinion, or abstract proposition. In this case, we give our assent. But assent is also used in conceding what we may withhold. We give our assent to the marriage of a daughter.

  • Consequently, assent has a more extensive application than consent. But the distinction is not always observed.
  • Consent often amounts to permission.
  • Defraud ye not one another, except with consent for a time. 1 Corinthians 7.
2. Accord of minds; agreement; unity of opinion.
  • All with one consent began to make excuse. Luke 14.
  • The company of priests murder by consent. Hosea. 6.
3. Agreement; coherence; correspondence in parts, qualities, or operation.
  • Such is the worlds great harmony that springs from union, order, full consent of things.
4. In the animal economy, an agreement, or sympathy, by which one affected part of the system affects some distant part. This consent is supposed to exist in, or be produced by the nerves; and the affections to be communicated from one part to another by means of their ramifications and distribution through the body. Thus, the stone in the bladder, by vellicating the fibers, will produce spasms and colic in the bowels; a shameful thing seen or heard will produce blushing in the cheeks. But many facts indicate that other causes than nervous communication produce sympathy.


CONSENT, v.i. [L. See the Noun.]

1. Literally, to think with another. Hence, to agree or accord. More generally, to agree in mind and will; to yield to what one has the power, the right, or the disposition to withhold, or refuse to grant.
  • If sinners entice thee, consent thou not. Proverbs 1.
  • And Saul was consenting to Stephens death. Acts 8.
  • Only let us consent to them, and they will dwell with us. Genesis 34.
2. To agree.
  • When thou sawest a thief, thou consentedst with him. Psalm 1.
3. To assent.
  • I consent to the law that it is good. Romans 7. 1 Timothy 6.

Through the Looking-Glass

Many Internet political pundits like to insinuate that whomever acquiesces to the iron fist of the State must be “asleep” and therefore not consciously aware of the tyranny swirling around themselves. While it is true that much of the domestic American population correctly fits this description, this very collectivist assumption does not account for those individuals who are painfully aware, but for whatever reason, choose to tacitly consent to absolute government. It is at this point that any allusions they make to children’s fairy tales breaks down completely.



Much like Wonderland, the Looking-Glass world is a figment of Alice’s imagination. Everything that happens from the time she climbed up into the looking-glass to when she shook the Red Queen, occurs while she is asleep. The only real place in the entire story is the room where she is playing with her kittens, and the only real creatures, besides Alice herself, are her cats.

Right from the start, the so-called “enlightened” have a tremendous allegorical problem. Their insistence that the mass population must “step through the looking-glass” in order to “wake up” is ill-conceived, because Alice did not “wake up” the more she stepped out of the house where she first met the White King and his Queen. There was nothing particularly illustrative or otherwise enlightening about Alice exploring the rest of the house before she left it, given that she was merely curious. Thankfully, unlike last time six months previously, she doesn’t seem to be double-guessing herself (at least, not as much).

Alice literally becomes a pawn of the White Queen, and if she can make it from the Second Square to the Eighth Square, Alice will become a Queen herself. This is the central plot device through which her several experiences with meeting and talking to the various creatures of the Looking-Glass world are able to happen. I sincerely doubt that the so-called “awakened” have ever made an allegorical argument that portrays Alice as a willing pawn in a political game of authoritarian domination conducted by government agents (who are represented in this story as the more powerful chess pieces).

Surrealistic absurdity is as integral to the culture of the Looking-Glass world as it was to Wonderland. From Humpty Dumpty to Tweedledee and Tweedledum, each one of these is a bumbling fest of slapstick comedy, word puns, or both. These interactions that Alice experiences suggest how profoundly unreal the whole environment is; it is not as if her travels there have made her more compassionate or wiser than before. If anything, the sheer lack of meaning in the behavior of the Looking-Glass’ inhabitants probably evinces a design by the author to encourage his readers to just not take anything too seriously, because what seems to be happening around Alice is all a big game, and an illusory one at that! This very Discordian interpretation is, I think, primarily supported at the end by the banquet when Alice shouts, “I can’t stand this any longer!,” followed by her addressing the Red Queen after grabbing her, “And as for YOU, I’ll shake you into a kitten, that I will!” It turns out that as she was truly waking up from her dream, Alice grabbed one of her kittens and shook her mercilessly; her brain was trying to interpret real-world phenomenon as dream imagery as she was rising from her slumber, very much like what happened last time with the falling leaves being interpreted by her mind as if they were a flying deck of cards.

Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There is not a deontological allegory, despite what some self-declared “activists” might claim. The absurdly surrealistic nature of the Looking-Glass world itself debunks any self-made Internet pundit’s assertion that “we” must “step through the looking-glass” and such trash, because the story itself does not lend itself to that, even allegorically. Perhaps those who advocate everyone else to become “fake awake” would do better to engage in reckless conspicuous consumption rather than frugally enjoy their liberty, because at least then they’d be more consistent with whatever shred of alleged integrity they might be able to hold onto.

Person “Legally” Defined

The following definitions for “person” are taken from Ballantine’s Law Dictionary (3rd edition), Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (6th edition), Black’s Law Dictionary (2nd edition), and Webster’s Dictionary (1828):




An individual or an organization [UCC § 1201(30)]. An individual man, woman, or child or, as a general rule, a corporation [18 AM J2d Corp § 20]. Inclusive of bodies politic and corporation [Waterbury v. Board of Com. 10 Mont. 515, 26 P 1002]. As used in the Bankruptcy Act, inclusive of corporations, officers, partnerships, and women, except where otherwise specified [Bankruptcy Act § 1(23); 11 USC § 1(23)]. Under the negotiable Instruments Law, an individual or a body of persons whether incorporated or not [Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 191]. As used in the anti-trust laws, inclusive of corporations and associations [36 Am J1st Monop etc § 186]. Inclusive of corporations where used in a statute imposing a license tax [33 Am J1st Lic § 49]. Usually inclusive of corporations in a tax statute [51 Am J1st W & L § 5]. Inclusive of corporations in a pure food law [State v. Belle Springs Creamery Co. 83 Kan 389, 111 P 474]. For the purposes of the due process clause, either a citizen or an alien [3 Am J2d Aliens § 8]. For the purposes of extradition, either a citizen or an alien [31 Am J2d Extrad § 17].

A corporation is deemed a “person” within the meaning of the statute of limitations, and consequently, the statute ordinarily runs against corporations and domestic corporations are generally included within the class of persons who may plead the statute, and they may, as a general rule, acquire title by adverse possession for the statutory period in the same manner and to the same extent as an individual [34 Am J1st Lim Ac § 372]. A municipal corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the statute of limitations [ 34 Am J1st Lim Ac § 397].

Liquor license laws may either expressly permit, or be held susceptible of a construction which authorizes corporations to be licensed thereunder, and the word “person,” as used in such legislation, is usually held to embrace a corporation, irrespective of whether there is an express provision to that effect in the license law or in general law [30 Am J Rev ed Intox L § 126].

The word “person,” where used in statutes defining crimes, is usually construed to include a corporation, so as to bring corporations within the prohibition of the statute [19 Am J2d Corp § 1436].

Dependent upon the entire context of the instrument, the word “person,” as used in a will, may or may not include a corporation [57 Am J1st Wills § 1326].



  1. This word is applied to men, women, and children, who are called natural persons. In law, man and person are not exactly synonymous terms. Any human being is a man, whether he be a member of society or not, whatever may be the rank he holds, or whatever may be his age, sex, etc. A person is a man considered according to the rank he holds in society, with all the rights to which the place he holds entitles him, and the duties which it imposes [1 Bouv. Inst. n. 137].
  2. It is also used to denote a corporation which is an artificial person [1 Bl. Com. 123; 4 Bing. 669; C. 33 Eng. C.L R. 488; Wooddes. Lect. 116; Bac. Us. 57; 1 Mod. 164].
  3. But when the word “Persons” is spoken of in legislative acts, natural persons will be intended, unless something appear in the context to show that it applies to artificial persons [1 Scam. R. 178].
  4. Natural persons are divided into males, or men; and females or women. Men are capable of all kinds of engagements and functions, unless by reasons applying to particular individuals. Women cannot be appointed to any public office, nor perform any civil functions, except those which the law specially declares them capable of exercising [Civ. Code of Louis, art. 25].
  5. They are also sometimes divided into free persons and slaves. Freemen are those who have preserved their natural liberty, that is to say, who have the right of doing what is not forbidden by the law. A slave is one who is in the power of a master to whom he belongs. Slaves are sometimes ranked not with persons but things. But sometimes they are considered as persons for example, a negro is in contemplation of law a person, so as to be capable of committing a riot in conjunction with white men [1 Bay, 358].
  6. Persons are also divided into citizens, and aliens, when viewed with regard to their political rights. When they are considered in relation to their civil rights, they are living or civilly dead; vide Civil Death; outlaws; and infamous persons.
  7. Persons are divided into legitimates and bastards, when examined as to their rights by birth.
  8. When viewed in their domestic relations, they are divided into parents and children; husbands and wives; guardians and wards; and masters and servants son, as it is understood in law [see 1 Toull. n. 168; 1 Bouv. Inst. b. 1890, note].



A man considered according to the rank he holds in society, with all the rights to which the place he holds entitles him, and the duties which it imposes [1 Bouv. Inst. no. 137].

A human being considered as capable of having rights and of being charged with duties; while a “thing” is the object which rights may be exercised.

  • Artificial persons: such as are created and devised bu law for the purposes of society and government, called “corporations” or “bodies politic.”
  • Natural persons: such as are formed by nature, as distinguished from artificial persons, or corporations.
  • Private person: an individual who is not the incumbent of an office.



PERSON, n. per’sn. [L. persona; said to be compounded of per, through or by, and sonus, sound; a Latin word signifying primarily a mask used by actors on the state.]

1. An individual human being consisting of body and soul. We apply the word to living beings only, possessed of a rational nature; the body when dead is not called a person. It is applied alike to a man, woman or child.
A person is a thinking intelligent being.
2. A man, woman or child, considered as opposed to things, or distinct from them.
A zeal for persons is far more easy to be perverted, than a zeal for things.
3. A human being, considered with respect to the living body or corporeal existence only. The form of her person is elegant.
You’ll find her person difficult to gain.
The rebels maintained the fight for a small time, and for their persons showed no want of courage.

Quote of the Week – Taking Your Time

Young guys want to run through their life as fast as they can; set it up, knock it down, set it up, knock it down. It’s short, real short. When you get to be my age, you get to see how short it is. The older you get, the closer you get to your death, you wanna relax, you want to take your time. There’s no rush, kid…you sure you don’t want that drink?”


– Jack Biggs